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INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE END OF ANTITRUST HISTORY




The great question facing U.S. antitrust law in the next few years is
how to respond to the European Union's (EU) increasing pressure for
the inclusion of antitrust standards in the managed regime for world
trade.' In this context, one must note the increasing aggressiveness of
European competition policy enforcement with respect to primarily
American transactions, such as the MCI-World Coin/Sprint, Boeing/
McDonnell Douglas, and GE/Honeywell mergers. Such cases either
reflect mere policy differences between U.S. and EU antitrust special-
ists or a self-conscious EU strategy designed to advance EU trade
interests and provoke international conflicts that will compel the
United States to come to the table and negotiate global standards for
antitrust enforcement. Less menacingly, one could see EU efforts to
force the inclusion of competition policy in the next round of global
trade talks as simply an effort to complicate those negotiations and
thereby reduce the pressure on the European Union for major conces-
sions on agricultural subsidies,2 and, by parity of reasoning, see U.S.
resistance as merely an effort to avoid a vehicle for imposing new limits
on U.S. anti-dumping laws.3 In any event, the recent Doha Declaration
* Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. A.B.
(1982), Harvard University;J.D. (1985), Columbia Law School. I want to thank George Garvey for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. Needless to say, the remaining errors are
mine alone.
1. See, e.g., David S. Evans, The New Trustbuster: Brussels and Washington May Part Ways, FOREIGN
AFi., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 14, 19 (reporting European pressure for inclusion of antitrust rules and
international antitrust governing authority under the umbrella of the WTO).
2. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L.
478 n.1 (2000).
3. See id. The basic argument for substituting a competition policy-based approach for
anti-dumping law is that anti-dumping law's effect as a check on international predatory pricing
can be achieved through domestic competition law. For the United States, this would entail
relying on Sherman Act predatory pricing claims and the Robinson-Patman Act's anti-price
discrimination provisions because exceptions available under the latter Act, such as the competi-
tion and cost-justifications defenses, also ensure that primarily only anti-competitive price
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of the World Trade Organization (WTO) now seems to suggest that the
door to including antitrust issues in the current WTO negotiating
round has been opened, although the question whether the member
states will walk through that door has not yet been answered.4
Now comes MarkJoelson's An International Antitrust Primer to inform
the coming debate about the inclusion of antitrust standards in the
Millenium Round negotiating agenda. This book is largely a new book,
although it purports to be a second edition of a volume Mr. Joelson
wrote with Earl W. Kintner a quarter-century ago in what now seems a
different world. It is now exclusively Mr. Joelson's handiwork, and it
reflects his valuable decades-long experience as an antitrust practitio-
ner. His thorough analysis of the complex structure of U.S. antitrust
law, the laws of major U.S. trading partners, and U.S. law, policy and
differentials are proscribed. See, e.g., Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of the Trade Laws and the
Antitrust Laws, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 479, 489-90 (1998) (noting that the NAFTA Task Force of the
ABA Antitrust Section proposed replacing anti-dumping laws with reliance on antitrust laws on
price discrimination and predation) (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, Antidumping and Antitrust, in THE
REPORT OF THE ABA ANTITRUST SECFION TASK FORCE ON THE COMPETITION DIMENSION OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ch. 6 (1994)).
4. Paragraph 23 of the Doha Declaration provides, as follows:
Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of
competition policy to international trade and development, and the need for enhanced
technical assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 24, we
agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session
on modalities of negotiations.
Ministerial Declaration, Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/i, 23 (Nov. 14, 2001). While the Declaration leaves open the possibility that the WTO will
not be able to reach a decision by "consensus" on the "modalities of negotiations," it does seem
clear that a decision in principle has been taken that the upcoming negotiating round must
include competition policy. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 1223-24 (4th ed. 2002) (noting the Ministerial
Conference Chairman's statement, albeit expressing his personal view, that the language of
paragraph 23 would permit any member to take a position on "modalities" that would block the
commencement of the negotiations contemplated by the Declaration).
5. MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE OPERATION OF
UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2d
ed. 2001). I should disclose that I have for several years served with Mr. Joelson on the Advisory
Committee to International Legal Materials, a publication of the American Society of International
Law, where I have come to appreciate his expertise and good judgment. I should also note that I
think so highly of Mr. Joelson's new book that I had provisionally decided to use it as the basic
materials in an Advanced Course in Antitrust Law scheduled for the spring semester of 2002, until
filling other teaching needs for my law school made my teaching this course impossible.
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practices concerning the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust,
intellectual property and fair trade law is leavened with a detailed
account of the keyjudicial decisions and administrative policy changes
that have shaped the current structure of international antitrust law, as
seen from the perspective of an insider. Mr. Joelson discloses, for
example, his own role as counsel for the Government of the United
Kingdom (p. 43), which filed an amicus brief in perhaps the most
important international antitrust case of the last generation, Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California.6 The book's tone as an insider account is
set, moreover, by a helpful foreword by Judge Diane P. Wood of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice. In short, it is the view from a high priest of the
American antitrust temple.
In my view, as a teacher of antitrust law and a former State Depart-
ment lawyer, Mr. Joelson's book is an exemplar of the kind of close and
perceptive analysis of the legal and policy dimensions of competition
law regimes and how they interact at the international level that only a
seasoned practitioner can provide. As a marker for the evolution of
international antitrust cooperation over the last generation, this book
will frame the issues for anyone genuinely interested in a realistic
understanding of the debate that has already commenced at the WTO
concerning the role of competition law harmonization and the mecha-
nism for its extraterritorial enforcement through global trade law.
But it would be unfair to describe this comprehensive review of the
issues as lacking a prescriptive argument. Indeed, the implicit message
of this book is made explicit in Judge Wood's foreword, where she
argues that antitrust cooperation can be separated from other policy
agendas driving national policymaking, including the temptation to
employ national antitrust policy for trade advantages (p. xiv), thus
implicitly arguing against seeking to discipline domestic antitrust law's
application to transactions affecting international trade. In a more
elliptical style, Mr. Joelson's largely hornbook-style analysis of the state
of the field contains an implicit argument, which the author makes
explicit only in the final chapter, "The Search for a Global Competition
Policy" (pp. 388-404). To his credit, Mr. Joelson reports the full range
of views represented in the February 28, 2000 Report of the Interna-
tional Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC), including the
dissenting views of Professor Eleanor M. Fox of New York University,
6. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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the foremost academic advocate for the accommodation of U.S. anti-
trust policy to the changing global environment through negotiations
at the WTO (p. 402). Nonetheless, Mr. Joelson downplays the possibili-
ties for global institutional management of antitrust policy conflicts,
relying on the basic conclusions of the ICPAC's majority report (pp.
400-02), and even on the EU Competition Commissioner Mario
Monti's own recognition that "first and foremost" the European Union
itself would seek to develop bilateral solutions to antitrust policy
conflicts (p. 403). Implicitly, if not explicitly, Mr.Joelson buttresses the
case for continued American exceptionalism in antitrust law and for
reticence in committing the United States to anything more than
management of the rough edges of international antitrust policy in the
years to come. This skepticism towards multilateral institutional solu-
tions clearly reflects the viewpoint of an antitrust practitioner with vast
experience and expertise that U.S. antitrust law and procedures can,
without abandoning core U.S. values, incrementally adapt themselves
to facilitate increased international cooperation. From this perspective,
therefore, the United States need not sacrifice its competition ideals at
the altar of free trade.7 Because this is the viewpoint from the inside of
the temple of U.S. antitrust law, those who would risk compromising
this faith should be asked to understand better what they would
abandon.
This Review Essay has two parts. First, it describes the structure,
content, and most important insights found in Mr. Joelson's volume.
Second, it evaluates the case for remaining faithful to the U.S. antitrust
faith in the context of the larger debate raging today about the
7. Cf Tarullo, supra note 2, at 479 (arguing that "forcing the square peg of competition
policy into the round hole of trade policy will change the shape of the peg"). The major premise of
Professor Tarullo's argument is that the governance approach of the WTO would ultimately
distort the formulation and interpretation of competition policy norms. Id. at 487-94. This
conclusion seems to be challenged by the WTO Appellate Body's recent increased deference
towards environmental values. Compare WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 1 153 (Nov. 6, 1998)
(holding that failure of the United States to engage in adequate efforts to achieve a multilateral
solution precluded its imposition of measures to encourage certain conservation efforts extraterri-
torially), with WTO Panel Report, United States-Restriction on Imports of Tuna (EC), WT/
DS29/R, 1 5.42 (May 20, 1994) (not adopted by the Contracting Parties) (suggesting that U.S.
conservation-related measures impermissibly sought to encourage conservation efforts extraterri-
torially). The WTO's obsession with welfare-maximizing trade values may well be attenuated by
the need to balance those values against other welfare-maximizing policies. Cf Antonio F. Perez,
The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19
BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 44, 47 (2001) (proposing a WTO solution for the problem of non-recognition
and enforcement of trade and investment-related judgments).
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continued feasibility of American exceptionalism. This debate has
recently been framed in terms of whether American values reflect the
"final" form of political and economic development compatible with
human freedom or merely one of a number of cultural forms in global
competition that will continue to clash for the foreseeable future, the
so-called Fukuyama-Huntington debate.8 Although Mr. Joelson has
very little to say about this explicitly, I will argue he implicitly makes a
case through the weight of overwhelming detail. His essentially prag-
matic argument is that the exposition of U.S., EU and other foreign
laws reveals that the United States has little to gain from international-
izing antitrust policy that cannot be gained through incremental
convergence as EU competition policy evolves and matures to resemble
more closely U.S. policy and procedures. 9 At the same time, the
potential cost of attempting to proselytize the globe may well provoke a
backlash against further globalization of antitrust values (p. 388).1°
This Review will suggest a theoretical explanation for the essentially
pragmatic conclusion that the United States should continue to oppose
negotiations at the WTO. This explanation has the virtue of drawing on
the special quasi-constitutional role of antitrust policy in U.S. history,
one that is in fact deeply connected to the political economy of U.S.
federalism and which, therefore, leaves less room for U.S. acquiescence
in the institutionalization of competition policy at the WTO than does
even the pragmatic argument for continued U.S. opposition to multilat-
eral and institutional approaches. This argument draws on the continu-
ing centrality of federalism as a regulatory device for U.S. political
economy, rather than on federalism's role in maintaining the self-
governance prerogatives, including antitrust immunity," of the Ameri-
8. See infra text accompanying notes 38, 39, 41 and 42.
9. For an explicit version of this argument, see Tarullo, supra note 2, at 495-99 (describing
the potential for "regulatory convergence" and the absence of a genuine threat to world economic
welfare).
10. For this point, MarkJoelson cites to THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE
(1999), and thus frames the issue as a conflict between technological change and traditional
culture. As this review will argue, infra text accompanying notes 38-46, it may be more productive
to assess the place of competition policy in terms of competing theories of political economy and
culture rather than levels of technological development and culture.
11. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1942) (expressing concern that applying the
Sherman Act to state action would raise federalism questions and for this reason, among others,
interpreting the Sherman Act to contain an implied exception for certain state action otherwise
inconsistent with federal competition policy). For evaluations of antitrust federalism grounded in
the governance prerogatives of states, compare Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home:
Lessons From Antitrust and Beyond, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 117-27 (2000) (arguing for retrench-
2002]
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can states. 12 It is worth noting that a federal antitrust policy became
central to U.S. political economy a hundred years ago as a perceived
necessity to circumvent the apparent inability of the states, due to a
narrow reading of state authority to regulate the national economy, to
regulate private power at a national level.' 3 The so-called populist
conception of U.S. antitrust law focuses on the preservation of a
counterweight to the concentration of private political power flowing
from the rise of the transcontinental corporation.1 4 This Review will
argue that it is federalism's role in reinforcing the political accountabil-
ity of national and state governments, and its correlative force in
furthering individual citizen responsibility in both our federal and state
political communities, that marries federalist political theory to the
role of U.S. antitrust laws in reinforcing individual responsibility for
economic liberty. Thus, together, U.S. federalism and U.S. competition
law tap into a classical tradition of republican government, shaping our
democracy and economy in mutually-reinforcing ways, so that the
selfish and embittering aspects of extreme individualism are softened
ment in U.S. federalism-based state immunity to allow U.S. antirust policy to regulate public power
on equal terms with private power), with Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43
WM. & MARY L. REv. 627, 765-67 (2001) (arguing that there is a body ofantitrust principles having
the status of international law that, as part of U.S. law, informs the practice of the federal
government and U.S. states equally and that, therefore, requires enhanced federal-state coopera-
tion in coordinating the antitrust practices of the states with federal international responsibilities
and interests).
12. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (finding stnicturally-required
limits on federal legislation under the Commerce Clause power in the area of "traditional" state
functions), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
13. Swaine, supra note 11, at 779 & n.592 (quoting from legislative history of the Sherman
Act). The Court later made clear that it understood the need for federal regulation of interstate
commerce to be deeply connected to the capacity of the states to do thatjob themselves. See H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
noted:
This Court has not only recognized this disability of the state to isolate its own economy
as a basis for striking down parochial legislative policies designed to do so, but it has
recognized the incapacity of the state to protect its own inhabitants from competition as
a reason for sustaining particular exercises of the commerce power of Congress to
reach matters in which states were so disabled.
Id. (citations omitted).
14. For assessments of the political economy of the Sherman Act, see generally Harlan M.
Blake &William KJones, In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1965); Kenneth G. Elzinga,
The Goals ofAntitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191
(1977); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. Rav. 1051 (1979).
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by the character-forming effects of participation in a competitive
market economy 15 and by democratic federalism's role in buttressing
responsible individualism. 16 It is thus the continuing relevance of
federalism's structuring of U.S. political economy that shapes U.S.
antitrust law and, accordingly, should limit U.S. participation in inter-
national antitrust lawmaking, for separating antitrust's political dimen-
sion from its substantive economic component in a WTO negotiation
might then risk undermining this carefully-constructed and uniquely
American contribution to global diversity.
Understood in this way, the evolution of U.S. antitrust law cannot be
countenanced, much less can a U.S. negotiating position at the WTO
be considered, without a more fundamental judgment about where the
United States stands on the possibility for cultural accommodation with
other political systems in the world less favorable to the preservation of
individualism as a legal, political, and economic ethic. In short, if U.S.
antitrust laws are part of the body of beliefs and institutions Fukuyama
would have us treat as the model for civilizational development, then
we dare not risk that special contribution to the potential for human
flourishing. If, on the other hand, U.S. antitrust law's path of develop-
ment is merely the language or rhetoric for solving tensions in political
economy between consumers and producers or an oscillating discourse
for protecting liberty- conceived either as equality of opportunity
and/or as equality of result, as the need for each becomes more
pressingl 7 -then there should be less resistance to accommodating
15. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society, in RivAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY
AND OTHER RECENTr ESSAYS 105, 106-109 (1986) (articulating the so-called "doux commerce" thesis,
which focuses on the role participation in market society plays in inculcating desirable psychologi-
cal attitudes and moral dispositions).
16. See generally MARTIN DIAMOND, As FAR As REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL ADMrr (William A.
Schambra ed., 1992). As Alan Gibson writes, reviewing Diamond, the Framers believed that
"[p] reserving decentralized federalism was important because it allowed citizens to conduct many
of their own local affairs. This... would help to mitigate the effects of individualism and to foster
an enlarged understanding of self-interest among citizens who were enticed into politics only on
the premise of economic gain." See Alan Gibson, The Legacy and Authority of the Founders, 56 REv.
POL. 555, 572-73 (1994). Claes Ryn, drawing on Madison's claim that a geographically extended
republic would "refine and enlarge" the public's views, argues that the fragmentation of power in
the American Constitution requires consensus for significant actions and compels a deliberative
process. The end effect of this, he argues, is the encouragement of moral reasoning in public
conduct. See CIAEs G. RxN, DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE: A PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS AND
COMMUNrIY 158 (2d ed. 1990) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961));
infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
17. See generally RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC,
LAw 284 (rev. ed. 2000) [hereinafter COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA] (deploying Michel Fou-
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other cultures' clashing methods for mediating the tension between
individual liberty and equalitarian agendas through a global competi-
tion agreement enforceable through the WTO.
II. THE ARGUMENT OF THE PRIMER
Unlike other volumes in the field-which specialize either in com-
parative antitrust, international law affecting antitrust issues, or offer
solely the perspective of one national regime situated in an interna-
tional context-An International Antitrust Primer brings all of these
features together in one manageable volume. It will prove of value to
students, beginning practitioners in international antitrust, andjournal-
ists or others policy experts whose need to understand international
antitrust issues requires a precise understanding of the operation of
various international and domestic legal regimes. Indeed, even sea-
soned practitioners will find many nuggets of value through careful use
of this volume; however, because it is unburdened by extensive foot-
notes, it clearly was not prepared to serve as a resource for scholars. 8
The substantive focus, however, is on U.S. and EU competition law.
The latter, in contrast to U.S. law, is described as a category of
supranational law, rather than the law of an emerging supranational
entity representing a distinct polity. 19 That said, EU competition law
not only "illustrates how supranational antitrust law can function
effectively," but also "has served as a model for some nations who are
still developing their approaches to the issue of restraint of trade" (p.
192). Detailed expositions of both U.S. (pp. 11-187) and EU (pp.
cault's insights into the nature of discourse to describe and critique the modes of argument that
have characterized different epochs in U.S. antitrust law); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of
Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283 (2001) (noting that Foucault's
theories have not been applied extensively to understand the growth and development of antitrust
law and policy).
18. For those purposes, one should turn to other works. See generally JAMES R. ATWOOD &
KJNGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (3d ed. 1997); SPENCER WEBBER
WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW (West Group 2001).
19. Indeed, the European Union has aptly been described as a "legal order established by
international treaties giving birth to an international organization that behaves as if its founding
instrument were not a treaty governed by international law, but a constitutional charter governed
by a form of constitutional law." Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First
Sight, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 495 (July 2001) (citing J.H.H. WEIER, THE CONSTITUTION OF
EUROPE.-"Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAvE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
221 (1999)); see alsoJ.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413-19 (1991)
(describing the process through which the European Court ofJustice forged a new constitutional
reality in Europe that transcended the individual Member States).
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191-306) competition law are usefully situated in the context of the
overall constitutional and legal systems in which they reside, including,
in particular, the U.S. (pp. 36-100) and EU (pp. 191-204) approaches
to the exercise of legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdic-
tion.
It is impossible in a brief review to dojustice to the detail and nuance
of An International Antitrust Primer. However, certain critical points
bearing on the possibilities for antitrust convergence emerge. On the
one hand, as Mr. Joelson effectively demonstrates, U.S. antitrust law in
key areas is also moving toward administrative control of what were
once judicially-monopolized policy decisions (pp. 168-76). In the criti-
cal area of mergers, a whole family of precedents satisfying the "incipi-
ency" standard for harm to competition under the Clayton Act's
merger provisions seem to have been overturned by the Guidelines for
Horizontal and Vertical Merger Analysis, issued by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the last two decades.2 °
The tilting of the antitrust interpretation playing field in the United
States towards administrative decision-making has also been exacer-
bated by a more restrictive judicially-made standing doctrine, which
now drastically reduces the risk of private attorneys general intervening
in merger cases to invoke the standards established by previous case
law. 21 In addition, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 requires pre-
merger notification to the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies, 22 thereby
allowing administrative decision-makers an opportunity to shape poten-
tial transactions to cure the most serious threats to competition and
thus ensuring that courts second-guessing consent agreements settling
DOJ enforcement actions under the Tunney Act usually review only
relatively unproblematic transactions. 23 Equally important, critical ad-
ministrative guidance is now available to parties engaging in interna-
20. Compare United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), and United States v.
Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) (employing market share analysis), with Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, April 2, 1992,57 Fed.
Reg. 41,552, 41,557 (Sept. 10, 1992) (employing Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) analysis).
21. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 US. 477, 489 (1977) (denying
competitor standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act in a challenge to an acquisition arguably
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, because competitor's injury, if any, would not have
been an antitrust injury, that is, injury of the kind the competition laws were designed to prevent).
22. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2001)
(amending the Clayton Act of 1914).
23. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (2000); see,
e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,148 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (citing
legislative history to argue that concentration of power in the hands of antitrust violators required,
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tional transactions through the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations ("International Guidelines").24 In short,
the increasing application of deference to the expertise of regulatory
agencies mandated by the Chevron principle as a matter of U.S. admin-
istrative law suggests an increasing role for the FTC and DOJ Antitrust
Division experts in the evolution of substantive antitrust doctrine.25
The tendency towards convergence in this area is not unambiguous,
however, for Hartford Insurance-like the European Community's Wood
Pulp case, 26 and perhaps implicitly in response to that case-takes the
position that courts need not even consider whether to exercise
restraint in applying domestic competition law to foreign parties on
international comity grounds unless there is a true policy conflict,
defined now in terms of whether the foreign party is compelled by its
own sovereign to engage in conduct that violates the national competi-
tion law. 27 The International Guidelines, by contrast, appear to con-
tinue the more restrained approach of earlier courts and commenta-
tors in the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction. 28 It
may well be that the Supreme Court's refusal itself to engage in the
kind of policy balancing required under the so-called jurisdictional
rule of reason is distinguishable from the Executive Branch and FTC's
willingness to exercise their delegated legislative discretion in determin-
ing the international reach of the U.S. competition laws (or, for that
in some cases, judicial review in order to avoid settlements that are "blatantly inequitable and
improper").
24. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, U.S. Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1995) [hereinafter International Guidelines], avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htxn.
25. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(requiring, when Congress's intent on a question is not clear, deference to the settled interpreta-
tion of the agency responsible for implementing the statute); see also Waller, supra note 11, at
127 n.71 (noting that, if anything, the courts have deferred more to DOJ, which is not a pure
"regulatory agency" delegated rulemaking authority by Congress, than to the FTC, which more
closely approximates the agency model contemplated in Chevron deference).
26. SeeCases 89, 104, 114, 116-17 and 125-29/85, Ahlstrom-Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n 1998 ECR
5193 (Wood Pulp Cases).
27. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 & n.24 (1993) (appearing to
rule out comity analysis and employment of the so-called jurisdictional rule of reason unless there
is a true conflict, defined as the inability to comply with both sets of laws simultaneously).
28. See International Guidelines, supra note 24, § 3.2. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, Reporters' Note 2 (1987). See generally
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 980
(2000) ("The DOJ and the FTC can and do factor comity judgments into their exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. They continue to do so after Hartford.").
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matter, from the International Guidelines function as simply advance
notice of the enforcement agencies' exercise of their "prosecutorial"
discretion) through invocation of a jurisdictional rule of reason. The
jury is still out, however, as to whether the Supreme Court will in later
decisions defer to the jurisdictional judgments of the DOJ and FTC
reflected in the International Guidelines. Thus, the discrepancy be-
tween judicially-created approaches and administrative enforcement
policy in the exercise ofjurisdiction in international antitrust cases now
joins merger analysis as an important uncertainty in U.S. antitrust law,
even as it becomes a possible area of U.S.-EU convergence.
On the other hand, Mr. Joelson makes clear that there are elements
of stark divergence between U.S. and EU competition law and policy.
The absence of private remedies and litigation, and correlatively treble
damages encouraging so-called private attorneys general to enforce
competition law, as is the case in the United States, centralizes antitrust
policymaking in the EU bureaucracy (pp. 200-04). The concentration
of authority in the European Commission ("Commission") arguably
serves the basic policy agenda of EU competition law, which-as part of
the constitutive instruments of the European Union 2- explicitly also
serves the quasi-constitutional function of ensuring that private (and
public) economic activity does not undercut the creation of a Euro-
pean common market (p. 200). This constitutional function is per-
formed instead in the U.S. by the Dormant Commerce Clause, which
has not been understood to contain any competition-related policy
values.30 Moreover, the emphasis on top-down control of market
activity translates into a legal background prohibiting any activities
29. SeeJOELSON, supra note 5, app. III.B (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union). The original competition provisions of the European Economic Community, articles 85,
86, and 90, have been renumbered as articles 81, 82, and 86 in the new version of the EEC Treaty
adopted as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Appendix helpfully includes both set of
numbers.
30. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (a majority of the Court
holding that a local ordinance creating a local waste station monopoly violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause because it operated as either protectionist legislation or unduly burdened
interstate commerce, although a strong dissent would have described the ordinance as merely
anticompetitive and, therefore, not unconstitutional); see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (adopting a common market rationale for the Dormant Commerce
Clause, Justice Jackson believed it advanced national prosperity through protecting consumers
only in the sense that "every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing
area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any"); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511,523 (1935) (justice Cardozo echoingJustice Jackson in arguing that "the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division").
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formally inconsistent with EU law prohibitions against concerted prac-
tices "distorting competition within the common market" and "abuse
of a dominant position"-which largely parallel the Sherman Act's
prohibition against concerted practices in "restraint of trade" and
"monopolization"-coupled with authority for the Commission to
grant so-called "block" exemptions for certain categories of practices,
which the Commission through experience has been able to determine
are pro-competitive and non-trade distorting (pp. 212-15). The con-
trast with U.S. doctrine could not be starker; for, under the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court elaborated over the course of a century,
rather than through administrative rulemaking, only extensive judicial
experience showing that a practice is uniformly anti-competitive merits
the determination that it is considered per se invalid, that is, without a
showing of its anti-competitive effects in a particular case. Otherwise, a
rule of reason analysis requires an explicit showing of anti-competitive
effect in a defined market, in which case the plaintiff (governmental or
private) carries the burden of persuasion. Indeed, even then the
defendant can subsequently rebut this prima facie case by establishing
a pro-competitivejustification for the challenged practice. 3'
Similarly, the migration of antitrust policymaking towards administra-
tive control has facilitated the triumph of more relaxed antitrust
enforcement in the United States, such as the utilization of the Herfin-
dahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for measuring the effect on market
concentration of a proposed merger, which often-depending on the
relative size of the leading firms-yields lower risk assessments than
traditional 4-firm concentration ratios, thus arguably raising the thresh-
old for finding risk to market performance from changes in market
structure.3 2 Meanwhile, the Commission utilizes HHIs to evaluate
whether to exempt horizontal cooperation agreements from Article 81
of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty") (p. 234), as well as for vertical merger
analysis (p. 247). The Commission does not appear to use HHIs for
horizontal merger or abuse of a dominant position analysis. Instead, it
appears to have adopted rules of thumb for market share analysis for
mergers drawn from its enforcement under the abuse of dominant
position prohibition under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, with post-
31. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-91, 695 (1978)
(articulating a rule of reason analysis that would allow a defendant to rebut a prima facie case of
anti-competitive effect).
32. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACrICE § 12.4 (2d ed. 1999).
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merger firm market shares as low at 50% shifting the burden of proof
to the applicant (pp. 292 and 296-97). This combined standard for
mergers and dominance seems to be roughly equivalent to U.S. policy
and practice for horizontal mergers, although it is closer to older U.S.
jurisprudence for mergers than to the traditional U.S. market share
standards for finding monopoly power (pp. 17 and 272). The real
difference is that given the Community's general prohibition against
certain kinds of vertical arrangements, subject to block exemptions,
such arrangements even when effected through vertical mergers are
still viewed with more suspicion in the European Union-where there
are "few indications to date that merger specific efficiencies will be-
come a significant criterion" (p. 296)-than in the United States,
where the post-Sylvania revolution on vertical restraints has led to
greater administrative receptivity to the pro-competitive effects of vertical
mergers.33 In short, and without too much exaggeration: in the United
States, whatever is not expressly prohibited is permitted; whereas in the
European Union, whatever is not expressly permitted is prohibited.
Yet, although virtually all of what An International Antitrust Primer
addresses, it addresses well, this reader would have preferred the same
level of attention to the constitutional context of the other national
competition systems addressed (i.e., Canada, Mexico, the United King-
dom, and Japan), which unfortunately are covered in only one-fourth
of the volume's roughly four hundred pages of analytical text. The
selection could also have been expanded to include potential NAFTA
parties, such as Chile, or countries that of necessity will be involved in
any eventual Free Trade Agreement for Americas, such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela. Alternatively, the volume might have been
leavened for comparative purposes by including other countries out-
side of NAFTA, the European Union, and Japan, even perhaps some
countries having little or no trade with the United States. In those cases,
where U.S. business groups might have less interest in the need for
legal certainty to facilitate trade and investment, the divergence be-
tween U.S. antitrust values and foreign regimes may well be greater and
perhaps, therefore, more revealing about the non-economic assump-
tions embedded in different kinds of competition policy.
33. See Cont' T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (adopting rule of reason
for non-price vertical restraints). Subsequently, the 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823, recognized that a pattern of vertical integration in an industry might signal the existence
of pro-competitive efficiencies that could be achieved in the merger context as well. See generally
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 369-77 (canvassing potential pro-competitive effects of vertical
mergers).
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Nonetheless, the scope of discussion and analysis is worthy, and the
volume contains a useful collection of appendices: a selected bibliogra-
phy, consisting of the most important books, websites, and decisions of
national and supranational competition agencies and courts (Appen-
dix I, pp. 405-13); titles of national competition laws, agencies, and
special courts (Appendix II, pp. 414-16); the texts of the various U.S.
and EU competition-related laws (Appendix III, pp. 417-41); the full
text of the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations (Appendix IV, pp. 442-67); and a Proposal for a Council
Regulation which would move toward decentralizing competition law
enforcement and placing more authority in the hands of the Member
States of the European Union (Appendix V, pp. 468-85). Importantly,
for a volume of this kind, the index is also well organized and quite
useful in quickly identifying the differences in doctrine and practice
among the jurisdictions covered with respect to specific theories of
antitrust invalidity.
The comparative significance of the last appendix, however, arguing
as it does a sea change in EU law in the direction of decentraliza-
tion-in EU "constitutional" terms, subsidiarity-warrants more atten-
tion than An InternationalAntitrust Primergives it (pp. 215-16). It may be
that different conceptions of federalism and subsidiarity will have
implications for competition policy convergence and management. To
take one example, the interface between trade law, competition law,
and intellectual property law (which may well emerge as the most
difficult challenge in the negotiation of a consolidated regime at the
WTO), needs to be understood in these terms. While the United States
by statute protects certain U.S. intellectual property rights from paral-
lel importation of products licensed for sale outside the United States
(pp. 144-45),34 the European Union, by contrast, extends the first sale
exhaustion concept for patents, trademarks, and copyrights to apply to
sales not only in the rights holder's Member State, but also in any other
Member State (pp. 245 and 258-61). As Mr. Joelson notes, "under
Article 36 (now Article 30), once the goods had been placed on a
Community market by the rights holder or by a third party with the
rights holder's consent, their parallel importation into another Mem-
ber State could not be blocked" (p. 259). Properly understood, how-
ever, U.S. and EU law are in accord on this point. It is the Dormant
34. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286, 292 (1988) (holding that an agency's
regulations precluding parallel importation of goods infringing U.S. trademarks was a permissible
interpretation of Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930).
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Commerce Clause under U.S. constitutional law, not the Sherman
Act, which creates a U.S. common market. It is not surprising that
the Dormant Commerce Clause commands the same result as the
synthesis of the trade-related and competition-related provisions
of EU law, taking into account, as noted above, that the European
Union has consistently assumed that its competition law and policy
are intended to reinforce the creation of a common market. Thus,
competition law in the European Union performs only centralizing
functions, so that competition policy and the EU quasi-constitutional
policy of subsidiarity are not in conflict, especially given the relative
weakness of subsidiarity in decentralizing EU governance.3 5 The same
question for the United States, however, requires a more sustained
analysis.
The next part of this Review Essay will seek to remedy An International
Antitrust Primds lack of attention to the convergence and global
regulatory implications of the tension between U.S. federalism and
traditional EU centralism by locating the decentralization issue in
terms of a larger debate about the relationship between, on the one
hand, the distinctive mode of democratic capitalism represented by
U.S. federalism and antitrust law and, on the other hand, the multiple
potential competing systems around the globe. In short, the unique
American synthesis is either a "final" product of evolution in political
economy or merely one of many possible forms, each with their virtues
and vices, that can each be improved through accommodation, compro-
mise, or legal borrowing. These larger questions need to be addressed
before we move toward global antitrust policy convergence or acqui-
esce in global institutional antitrust policy coordination at the WTO
level.
III. THE "ENDURING FREEDOM" OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
The recent U.S. military operation in Afghanistan to suppress the
Taliban and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, which was code
named "Enduring Freedom," is in part at least a response to a violent
manifestation of the anti-globalization backlash so aptly described in
Thomas Friedman's The Lexus and the Olive Tree.36 In citing this work,
35. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 267-83. The phenomenon suggested by Friedman's
colncernl about a "backlash" against globalization is also a central theme of much of the popular
literature in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the Pentagon and World Trade
Centers. It seems, in short, to express the zeitgeist.
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Mr. Joelson's An International Antitrust Primer (p. 388) invokes the
received image of globalization as the dominant phenomenon of the
new century. Implicitly then, the technocratic vision Mr.Joelson articu-
lates in the book takes no position on the relationship between
competing conceptions of antitrust law and the larger value conflicts
antitrust law has historically mediated .
A. Globalization's Challenge
However, translated to a context of globalization, the great debate of
this era may well be whether the organizing vision of the United States'
engagement with the world is best captured by Francis Fukuyama's The
End of History38 or, instead, by Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civiliza-
tions.39 Under the former vision, the core principles of democratic capital-
ism, which have largely reached their clearest expression in the socio-
political order of the United States, have triumphed over all other
competing models. Fukuyama's explanation of the meaning of the fall of
the Soviet Union barely ten years ago gained currency in the years
immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Fukuyama seemed the
early apparent winner in the race for the overarching concept that would
define U.S. grand strategy in the post-Communist period, much as George
Kennan's famous Mr. X article in the respected journal Foreign Affairs
defined the character of the Stalinist state and drew the necessary implica-
tions for a Western grand strategy of containment.4 As post-Communist
brushfires erupted over the globe and a new competition emerged
between the United States and rising forces in East Asia and the Middle
East, Huntington advanced a vision that saw no final victory for
Western democratic capitalism, but rather, imagined an emerging, yet
unavoidable, conflict between the great civilizations of the world, each
37. See generally PERITZ, supra note 17 (describing American antitrust policy's evolving
relationship in the United States to public perceptions of the danger of economic and/or political
domination).
38. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INT., Summer 1989, at 3.
39. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 31 (1996).
40. See X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AsF. 566 (1947) (authored by George
Kennan while he served as Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and widely
believed, therefore, to represent official policy of containment of Soviet power and international
communism).
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defined in terms of fundamental views of man, society, and the state.4'
Huntington distinguished Europe and North America from other
civilizations, including Orthodox Russia and Latin America, but he
treated Western civilization as a whole. 4' However, a plausible case can
be made that the Americans and the Europeans, as children of differ-
ent, and incompatible, revolutionary experiences,43 are no more alike
than the Orthodox Russians and the Latin Americans.
Drawing on the intuition that the American way and the European
way may well be different in reality, the macro-level debate between
Fukuyama and Huntington might be played out in smaller, more
manageable sets of issues posing the same basic value conflicts. One
fruitful place to explore a more focused inquiry into the relevance of
the Fukuyama and Huntington theses may be the case of negotiating
international competition policy coordination in the next decade.
Understood in those terms, the tensions between those civilizations-
tensions that are generally agreed to have been exacerbated by the
globalization phenomenon Friedman describes so lucidly-reflect com-
peting and as yet unresolved views about the relative weights that
should be attached to individualist and communitarian visions of social
and economic organization. The former places consumer sovereignty
and technological progress through creative destruction at the apex;
44
the latter seeks to regulate and direct the evolution of the economy to
achieve a plurality of values, including the protection of certain kinds
of market participants from ruinous competition, the reduction of
costs of social dislocation, and the preservation of traditionally-valued
ways of life-values which in an earlier era may also have been part of
41. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 39, at 28; John H. Knox, The Case of the Missing Paradigm, 32
TEX. INT'L L.J. 355 (1997) (evaluating the implications of Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order for international law).
42. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 39, at 45-48 (distinguishing between Latin American,
Orthodox Russian, and Western Civilizations, but not between American and European).
43. See generally HANNA ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1965) (arguing that the American revolu-
tion, unlike the French revolution, sought to restore liberty through a particular conception of
order); see also STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 8 (1993) (describing the
influence in the American Revolution of the Renaissance intellectuals, who reconstructed classical
thinking on the "mixed and balanced constitution as that kind least unstable, as well as of such a
commonwealth's providing the most ample setting for men's [sic] own self-realization").
44. See generallyJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950)
(advancing the "creative destruction" thesis as the key to dynamic efficiency); ROBERT BORI, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 81-88, 107-32 (1978) (arguing for consumer
welfare maximization policy, including attention to the promotion of productive efficiency, as the
only policy goal of the Sherman Act).
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the U.S. competition matrix.4" Some commentators see this increas-
ingly clear value conflict in competition policy as symptomatic of more
fundamental differences between the trajectories of U.S. and Euro-
pean society that are not amenable to harmonization or convergence,
but rather, can at best merely be managed.46
At issue then may be the nature and purpose of U.S. antitrust law:
either as the continuing expression of core economic and socio-
political ideals of American democratic capitalism, or, alternatively, as a
dispensable portion of our national heritage, one that can be adapted
to meet the needs of cooperation between "civilizations" in the ongo-
ing task of avoiding too violent a clash of civilizations. For many, U.S.
antitrust law is more than merely one of a number of policy instruments
designed to regulate effectively the U.S. market. It is, rather, central to
American beliefs, not only concerning the ideal economy but also
about the ideal political structure and, perhaps, even the ideal citizen;
at least this is what generations of American law students trained in the
rhetoric deployed by Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa case have been
indoctrinated to believe about the Sherman Act. For Hand believed:
it is no excuse for "monopolizing" a market that the monopoly
has not been used to extract from the consumer more than a
"fair" profit. The Act has wider purposes. Indeed, even though
we disregarded all but economic considerations, it would by no
means follow that such concentration of producing power is to
be desired, when it has not been used extortionately. Many
believe that possession of unchallenged economic power dead-
ens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress
is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well
enough alone. Such people believe that competitors, versed in
the craft as no consumer can be, will be quick to detect
45. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1053-54,
1060-65 (1979) (rejecting the Borkian view and, drawing on legislation enacted after the Sherman
Act, arguing that-whether or not consumer welfare maximization was ever the only policy goal of
U.S. competition law-current law mandates a more multi-factorial analysis in certain contexts).
46. See Evans, supra note 1, at 17-18 (contrasting the fundamentally different approaches
taken by the United States and the European Union to competition policy and law). Mr. Evans'
intuition about civilizational differences between the United States and the EU may also reflect a
difference between Anglo-American and continental philosophy. See Competing Visions, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 21, 2002, at 61-62 (reporting the United Kingdom's adoption of a merger review
standard probably equivalent to the U.S. standard).
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opportunities for saving and new shifts in production, and be
eager to profit by them.... It is possible, because of its indirect
social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers,
each dependent for his success upon his own skill and charac-
ter, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must
accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we
have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think
the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.47
Hand implicitly recognized that the Sherman Act initially could well
have been a charade, an attempt to refer to the courts for inaction the
problem of increasing concentration of power in American society in
the hands of the few.48 Yet, the "decisions," which Hand found to give
the Act a broader meaning, may well have included not only those of
the Supreme Court in interpreting the Sherman Act, but also the
judgments of the Executive Branch in seeking to enforce it more
vigorously. It was Theodore Roosevelt's grand, albeit not unambiguous,
response to the political sea change brought about by populism's
anti-authoritarian attempt to realize the Founders' vision of American
liberty, in a new technological and industrial context, that made the
Sherman Act the "law" Hand also felt bound to interpret.
49
For others, based on their reading of the Sherman Act's legislative
history, the Act is merely a policy instrument designed to maximize
consumer welfare, the core intuition of the Chicago School-approach
popularized by Judge Bork and arguably dominant in the recent
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court:
The legislative histories of the antitrust statutes, therefore, do not
support any claim that Congress intended the courts to sacrifice
consumer welfare to any other goal. The Sherman Act was clearly
presented and debated as a consumer welfare prescription. The
same clarity may not be present in the history of the later statutes,
but consumer welfare is a major component in the debates, and
there is no indication of any congressional decision to sacrifice
consumer welfare in any case to any other value.50
47. SeeUnited States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
48. See RicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADION 230-31 (1973 ed.).
49. SeeRIcHARD HOFSTmDTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, FROM BRYANTO F.D.R 227 (1955).
50. See BORK, supra note 44, at 63-66 (reading the legislative history of the Sherman Act, and
related antitrust statutes, to further the single policy of consumer welfare maximization, in large
part to avoid a background constitutional concern that to do otherwise would vest excessive
law-making authority in thejudiciary).
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Thus, two views of the relation between the modern American
commitment to antitrust law and the alternative conception that may
be emerging throughout the globe seem to be permissible.
For followers of Fukuyama, then, a global reform agenda based on a
broader vision of the purposes of American antitrust law would operate
at two levels of institution-building: the domestic and the international.
At the domestic level, the goal of exporting American-style democracy
after the Second World War was inextricably connected to exporting
American style antitrust to the defeated Axis powers. Similarly, the U.S.
agenda for policy reform in the new democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall included antitrust
reform. In promoting competition as a crucial reform policy, the
United States sought not only to spur economic development and
innovation, but also, drawing on the faith that competition law would
further democracy by breaking down the economic walls of cartels and
exclusive dealing, to change the very nature of post-Communist cul-
tures, thus supporting the emergence of a culture of transparency and
an ethic of individualism.
At the international level, the post-Second World War generation of
American leaders thought it important to include competition prin-
ciples in the proposed but aborted Havana Charter and International
Trade Organization, in order to transform the international trading
system and thus provide the context for strengthening national democ-
racies. By contrast, the post-Cold War generation has recoiled at the
idea of including antitrust principles as part of the legal fabric for
democratic capitalism in the new World Trade Organization. Ironi-
cally, it is now the European Union which seeks to bring competition
policy to the table at the World Trade Organization, while the United
States under both the Clinton and Bush administrations argues for
their continued exclusion. Some American neo-isolationists might now
argue that U.S. antitrust values would be impoverished through inclu-
sion in the new WTO. Also, those holding that core values of antitrust
law are central to American democracy would not be prepared to
accept the weakening of U.S. antitrust principles in order to enhance
predictability for the global economy, even if the United States, as the
largest participant in that global economy, would have the most to gain.
Rather, they might argue that the natural evolution of economy and
society in the direction of the democratic capitalism epitomized by the
values of U.S. antitrust law over time will characterize the central
tendency of antitrust law's evolution under the law of U.S. trading
partners. Under this view, the progressive victory of U.S. values might
be better achieved through continued antitrust cooperation at a bilat-
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eral and technical level, thereby avoiding a premature consensus on
global antitrust values that would delay the imperative for evolution in
the direction of a powerful U.S. national commitment to competition
as national economic policy and as socio-political ideal.51
For followers of Huntington, the efforts to internationalize anti-
trust were attempts at legal transplantation in infertile soil doomed
to failure. At the same time, the needs of U.S. business to accommo-
date itself to the likelihood of continued divergence from American
values in national competition policy argue for the use of some level
of international policymaking to reinforce positive developments in
foreign law, even at the price of accepting lower international
standards and trading off some American trade interests in the
process of bargaining during the Millennium Round of WTO nego-
tiations. A persistent clash of civilizational values would make, for
the United States, the best international antitrust policy agenda the
enemy of a good international antitrust policy agenda. Accordingly,
the business and political elites favoring a level playing field for U.S.
business in the new world created by decreasing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods and services must adopt a more realistic
stance about what can be achieved through continued unilateral
and technical approaches to international antitrust issues in the
foreseeable future before they reject out of hand deals that are now
achievable at the WTO.
B. Federalism's Response
The uniqueness of the U.S. model of capitalism and democracy is
highlighted by its relationship to the peculiarly American fascination
with federalism. If Fukuyama and Huntington agree that there is
something distinctive about the American contribution to democratic
capitalism, then surely for constitutional lawyers that uniqueness can
be located in federalism; the implications of federalism include not
only creating a national common market, but also assuring that manage-
ment of that market will remain, to some degree at least, accountable to
local constituencies and interests and thereby free from political domi-
nation from the center. The "constitutional character" of the Sherman
Act was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court early in American
antitrust history, in the sense that, as "a charter of freedom, the Act has
a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
51. Seegenerally Tarullo, supra note 2.
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in constitutional provisions. 5 2 But in the establishment of freedom,
federalism's chief goal is the vertical and horizontal division of power,
largely to ensure political competition between different centers of
power for the support of the people. 53 Indeed, the neo-federalist
revival in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is largely
grounded on the notion that the Framers "split the atom of sover-
eignty," so that "our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and the other federal, each protected from incursion by the other."54 In
short, the ethic of political competition is built into the very fabric of
American life and the need to maintain that political competition from
the distorting effects of concentration of private, as well as public, power
are never far from American political thought. This ethic of competition
in the political sphere, much as in the economic sphere, arguably pro-
motes public deliberation in the pursuit of the common good. At least that
was the original conception; 55 whether it survives is an open question.
The structural integrity of states as independent political actors also
plays a role in antitrust federalism. In the context of U.S. antitrust law, this
concern manifests itself in the form of the Parker v. Brown doctrine of state
action immunity.5 6 By contrast, European law directly applies competition
policy to the public sector. European extension of competition policy to
state enterprises may reflect, as some commentators suggest,5 7 the larger
role of the state in European economy, thereby necessitating the
52. SeeAppalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).Justice Hughes
added that the Act did "not seek to establish a mere delusive liberty" but rather sought to establish
a "standard of reasonableness." Id. at 360.
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he
constant aim is to divide and arrange several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check
on the other ... ").
54. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the U.S. Constitution created two sets of rights and obligations-state and
federal-for the people governed respectively by each).Justice Kennedy's formulation draws on
the need for the people to retain the right and the duty to hold their representatives in each
sphere of government accountable for the benefits and burdens of policymaking at each level of
government. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (articulating the rule
against legislative commandeering by the federal government on precisely these grounds).
55. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 50-51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing the effects of the republican form of government and noting that the public view will
be enlarged and refined when passed through the medium of a body of representatives and that
factions are to be less feared in part because "communication is always checked by distrust in
proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary").
56. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351-52 (1942).
57. See Robert H. Lande, Professor Waller's Un-American Approach to Antitrust, 32 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 137, 139-42 (2000).
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application of competition policy in this area to ensure not only the
protection of competition values, but also the even more important
community trade protecting functions of EU competition law. Yet the
extension of competition law to member state activity may also reflect
the relative weakness of the European Union's commitment to subsid-
iarity, as compared to the U.S. commitment to federalism. It should be
remembered that the efficiency of the level of policy determination is
the key criterion under the principle of subsidiarity, and it would seem
obvious that the efficiency of a common set of policies would appear to
be manifest in the competition area. 58
Policy convergence on this issue of democratic structure, at least as
viewed from the U.S. perspective, is problematic at best. Whether U.S.
antitrust state action immunity is grounded solely in statutory interpre-
tation or really is commanded by the Constitution would surely be put
to the test if the United States were to follow the international trend on
this issue. Alternatively, the United States would have to pay the price in
trade concessions in order to maintain its own accommodation be-
tween the sovereignty of sub-state entities and national economic
policymaking. The United States is currently constrained by federalism
principles in the government procurement area, where it cannot make
binding commitments on behalf of states without testing the limits of
political feasibility and perhaps constitutional authority.59 In the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause context, the Supreme Court has recognized a
so-called market participant exception, under which states may exer-
cise their rights to condition sales and purchases in the marketplace so
as to further their narrow self-interests, even at the risk of abridging the
operation of the federal common market,60 although one precedent
58. See generally Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L. 205, 224-25 (1990); Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the
European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FoRDsAbm INT'L L.J. 846, 875-79 (describing the
principle of subsidiarity as relating only to locating governance at the level capable of maximizing
the welfare gains achieved by the governmental policy in question). A minority of the U.S.
Supreme Court, in rejecting the majority's view of federalism as ensuring political liberty through
maintaining a political market structure ensuring competition between state and federal sover-
eigns for the support of the people, instead has fashioned a theory of cooperative federalism and,
accordingly, looks to European constitutional thinking for analogies. See, e.g., Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer,J., dissenting).
59. See Waller, supra note 11, at 124 n.61 (asserting, without argument, that Congress could
bind the states in this area under the Commerce Clause, although such a measure would be
politically unthinkable).
60. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (establishing the
so-called market participant exception).
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does suggest that this exception operates more narrowly in the context
of foreign commerce. 6 In a recent case raising foreign relations
federalism questions, for example, the Supreme Court held that where
Congress has specially delegated authority to the president to regulate
U.S. economic relations with a particular country in order to achieve a
foreign policy goal, state action in that same area is preempted and, if
taken, unconstitutional.62 The Court did not, however, address whether
state sovereignty over core domestic regulatory concerns could be
trumped under the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, despite the reversal through Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority6 3 of the National League of Cities v. Usery64 zone of
Tenth Amendment protection from federal authority under the Com-
merce Clause, the Supreme Court's subsequent jurisprudence under
the Commerce Clause 65 and the Eleventh Amendment 66 suggests
renewed receptivity to the idea that a hard core of state sovereignty over
local policymaking requires some level of constitutional protection. If
this is so, the case for Parker v. Brown immunity may stand on stronger
constitutional foundations than we have previously believed, even if
courts have not generally reached the question.67 The relationship
between the two, the Eleventh Amendment and the Parker doctrine,
depends of course on whether the state itself or a private person,
pursuant to clearly articulated and actively supervised state policy, is the
defendant. But there seems to be no good reason to separate the two
analyses when the fundamental question is whether a state should be
free from federal competition policy, either directly or through agents
or independent contractors, to prefer other values to those embodied
61. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,95-96 (1984).
62. SeeCrosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
63. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531, 546-47 (1985).
64. SeeNat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (decided the same day as Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap).
65. SeeUnited States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-67 (1995) (concluding that although Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause is broad, "it does not include the authority to regulate each
and every aspect of local schools").
66. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Commerce
Clause); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72, 91 (2000) (holding that Congress, in
passing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, "did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity to suits by private individuals"); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672, 685-86, 691 (1999). See generally Susan Beth Farmer, Altering the
Balance Between State Sovereignty and Competition: The Impact of Seminole Tribe on Antitrust State
Action Immunity Doctrine, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1403 (1997).
67. SeeWaller, supra note 11, at 120 n.37 (citing authorities).
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in the Sherman Act.
68
As a side note, it is important to recognize that the tension between
U.S. constitutional or quasi-constitutional values and international
decision-making is not limited to antitrust issues. Even outside the
WTO, the United States is facing a similar choice in the context of
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment's constitutionalization of "minimum contacts" jurispru-
dence, which serves as a limit on the exercise of state sovereignty in its
adjudicative jurisdiction so as to preserve individual liberty, includes
the so-called "doing business" ground for exercise of jurisdiction,
international sensibilities are offended and may well prevent the United
States from securing foreign recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments by treaty.6 9 Arguably, however, these constitutional limits
68. Recently, in the Bivens context, the Supreme Court has implied a remedy to vindicate the
interests of victims of tortious conduct by federal agents acting in violation of Fourth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional guarantees. The Court also drew a distinction
between actions against the state's individual agents and actions against independent contractors.
See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 122 S. Ct. 515, 517-523 (2001). In the latter case, because
adequate state law remedies remained available against the independent contractor, who unlike a
federal official would not ordinarily be able to assert qualified immunity, there was no need to
imply a constitutional remedy. Id. at 521 (noting likelihood that only the government would be
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, since government officers would be able to assert
qualified immunity, with the result that constitutional violations by government officers might go
undeterred in certain contexts). Malesko also noted the potential caveat of the government
contractor defense available under Boyle v. Technology Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Id. at 523 n.
6
.
By parity of reasoning, in the Parker v. Brown context, unless an agency or instrumentality of
the state was the defendant and benefited from state sovereign immunity, there would seem to be
no need to imply a constitutional entitlement to a remedy in order to vindicate those rights. See
Waller, supra note 11, at 118 n.24. But that begs a larger question: Are there constitutional rights
to be free from state interventions in the economy that favor one class of producers or consumers
over others? This issue has sometimes been framed as a regulatory takings argument.
Regardless of whether under U.S. law there is a constitutional right to free trade, it is worth
noting that some international law scholars trained in the so-called "Austrian" school have
suggested that there is an international individual right to free trade. This right is protected by the
trend toward increasing international law limits on the freedom of states to distort international
free trade through tariffs and non-tariff interventionist policies, such as antidumping and
countervailing duty law. See, e.g., Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and the Millennium
Round, in NEW DIREcTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOR OFJOHN H.JACKSON
111, 130 (Marco Brondkers & Reinhard Quick, eds., 2000) (arguing that the "basic objectives of
human rights law and WTO law are complementary and similar"). Even conventional U.S.
antitrust law commentators have suggested-largely for reasons of furthering transparency,
legitimacy, and fairness-that the first targets for policy reform in the promotion of international
trade should be antidumping and countervailing duty policies, which could simply be replaced by
antitrust doctrine addressing real predatory pricing strategies. See Waller, supra note 11, at 130-33.
69. SeePerez, supra note 7, at 62-63.
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are more sensitive to federal interests when foreign commerce is
implicated.7 ° Can antitrust federalism then adapt to global governance
any better than the component of federalism that limits the personal
jurisdiction of state courts?
IV. CONCLUSION
The question really is not all that new. U.S. antitrust law has always
adapted to the changing needs of the moment. The genius of the
common law system of antitrust precedents and the continued flexibil-
ity of antitrust enforcement policy permit U.S. antitrust law to evolve to
serve the values Learned Hand so elegantly articulated in the Alcoa
case. Improved economic learning and better understanding of the
social context for antitrust policy decisions matter. But deeper reflec-
tion on the relation between the economic and cultural values of U.S.
antitrust law and their relation to the continuing vibrancy of our
democracy may be even more important. The political economy of
antitrust law in the United States is central to fostering civic virtue so as
to fulfill, at least in part, the vision of the American experiment.71 We
should be aware that the precise relationship between market society
and civic virtue has remained a subject of intense debate, about which
Americans and Europeans will no doubt intensely disagree.72 But
debate about the moral value of capitalism and its premises, including
the role of a clear and protected right to property balanced by
recognition of the social implications of its establishment and exercise,
is healthy. Indeed, if a theologically driven institution such as the
Papacy is capable of modulating its views on the moral status of
capitalism in light of changing circumstances, 73 then perhaps so also
70. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980) (justify-
ing the so-called "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction on federalism grounds), with
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
mere placement by a foreign manufacturer of a product into the "stream of commerce" as a basis
for finding "purposeful availment" of forum's benefits and meeting the minimum contacts test for
personal jurisdiction).
71. See ELKNS & McKITRICK, supra note 43, at 20-21 (explaining the moderate, non-
mercantilist political economy of the Framers in part as a rebellion against British court-centered
mercantilist corruption).
72. See Hirshman, supra note 15, at 109-17.
73. See Pope John Paul II, Centessimus Annus: On the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum
Encyclical Letter (1991), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOcIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENrARY HERITAGE
439-461 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) (further clarifying the modern
Church's highly critical stance towards capitalism, in view of an earlier encyclical's critical stance
toward the excesses of capitalism in the late 19th century). Perhaps the strongest formulation of
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may be the high priests of the American and European temples of
competition law.
Thus, it would be surprising to expect that antitrust values, any more
than other elements of the U.S. experience, would remain static in the
face of either a changing international economy or a changing interna-
tional political system. U.S. antitrust law must adapt to new threats to
economic freedom, as evidenced in the struggle of judges and Execu-
tive Branch policymakers to come to grips with the implications of the
technological revolution of the last decade. This is no less true for U.S.
antitrust thinking than for American grand strategy's need to adapt to
new external threats to American freedom, as evidenced in the new
kind of war the United States is fighting against global terrorism. In
short, Mr. Joelson's detailed account makes a strong case for not
abandoning U.S. antitrust law in the context of WTO negotiations.
However, it does not make the case for what kind of antitrust law U.S.
negotiators should strive to protect in those negotiations because we
still do not have a considered vision of U.S. competition policy in the
new world of increasing returns to scale and innovation markets that
promises an eventual paradigm shift in U.S. antitrust law.
In many respects the path of U.S. antitrust law has reflected the
oscillation of antitrust between competing tendencies over the control
of private and public power.7 " Surely, then, as international regulation
becomes a more important force in governing the everyday lives of U.S.
citizens, antitrust values will need to be translated to that context as
well. Preserving the freedom of Americans to participate in the political
process and achieve their goals through the level of government most
the Roman Catholic Church's position-rejecting not capitalism but rather rejecting treating
capitalism as an all-encompassing ideology-is found in the Papal encyclical on the concept of
development for the post-colonial era. Pope Paul VI, after noting the rise of industrial society,
observed that "it is unfortunate that on these new conditions of society a system has been
constructed which considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, competition as the
supreme law of economics, and private ownership of the means of production as an absolute right
that has no limits and carries no corresponding social obligation." Pope Paul VI, Populorum
Progessio: On the Development of Peoples (1967) 1 26, reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE
DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE, supra, at 240, 246. In short, it was not capitalism that the Papacy rejected,
but rather the perversion of capitalism into a "stifling materialism." Id. at 244. Properly under-
stood, then, the Church's teaching is fully consistent with treating competition law as an evolving
set of precepts because the social good to be achieved through competition law varies with the
changing requirements of the common good.
74. See Waller, supra note 11, at 117-18 & n.23 (noting that the reaction to the Microsoft
litigation has largely followed from a prior view of whether government power or private power is a
greater danger to individual liberty and American democracy).
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closely connected to them-in many cases their states and localities-
will require that international antitrust policy take into account the
relation between, on one hand, international market structure, con-
duct, and performance and, on the other, international democratic
structure, conduct, and performance. Accordingly, the next book to be
written on international antitrust, now that Mr. Joelson has provided a
roadmap through the legal thicket, should address the comparative
political economy of antitrust law. This project will require a collabora-
tive effort of antitrust, constitutional, and international lawyers, econo-
mists, and students of comparative and international politics. Fortu-
nately, a third edition may be available by then, remedying the few
defects of the second.
In sum, the debate concerning the U.S. negotiating position with
respect to antitrust's inclusion in the next Millennium Round of WTO
negotiations begs a further set of questions about the actual operation
of antitrust law in national economies and the precise interaction
between competition, trade, and democracy. This most definitely re-
quires top-down thinking, as suggested by the Fukuyama-Huntington
debate. More important, however, it requires bottom-up thinking. We
need an accurate assessment of the true role and trajectory of antitrust
law in the United States today, as well as an assessment of the real
possibilities for convergence towards the American ideal in foreign
antitrust systems. In short, we need some comparative public law that
will provide the raw material for those who want to generate policy
options. Mr. Joelson's contribution, therefore, is not only addressed to
the present; it is a challenge for the future and an invitation to question
where we are and where we are going. Can one say anything better
about a new book?
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